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The Clarendon Aristotle Series is releasing a new volume containing a 
translation, commentary and notes on the De Anima by Christopher Shields. This new 
volume offers several novelties in comparison with its predecessor in the same 
collection, namely, the classic work of 1968 on the De Anima by D. W. Hamlyn. The 
first of the items I want to mention is, evidently, an improvement: Shields’ translation 
takes into account the whole treatise, something that Hamlyn’s did not offer. For the 
latter skips from chapter 2 to 5 of the first book (he actually just took into account a 
few passages of Book I), because he thinks of it as a mere review of past opinions. In 
Shields’ work, a complete translation is accompanied by the presentation of a 
commentary on those formerly missing chapters, which not only contributes to the 
discussion in Aristotelian scholarship (maybe in Presocratic scholarship too), but also 
could be useful for providing an explanation of the presence of the doxographical 
accounts in Aristotelian treatises. 
 The volume, then, is divided in two main parts: the translation and the 
commentary. It has also an introduction to the text, focusing on the main problems 
that arise from the treatise; a discursive outline, which can serve as a map; a list of 
notes on the Greek text (mainly pointing out where the reading has changed, but 
rarely the reasons why); a discursive glossary on Aristotelian terminology; and the 
bibliography. 
 
Introduction 
 
The introduction of this text is very useful for a student on philosophy: it 
concentrates less on historical features and philological issues related to the De Anima 
                                                     
* This research is funded by FAPESP (Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa de São Paulo), proc. 
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itself or its material transmission, and more on philosophical problems. This particular 
feature is in perfect harmony with Shield’s own declaration that “the Clarendon 
Aristotle Series takes as its mission a plain, forthright exposition of Aristotle’s 
philosophy for the engaged Greekless reader rather that the professional philologist” 
(p. xlvii).  
Now, this fact is evident if we look at the architecture and content of the four 
subjects of the introduction. The first one, called “The Place of the De Anima in the 
Aristotelian Corpus” draws mainly on technical aspects, like the use of vocabulary, 
that can establish relationships with the rest of the Aristotelian works. As I said 
before, it contains no philological questions: the point that Shields displays has 
nothing to do with stylistic or textual matters of the treatise; its scope is, rather, 
towards the conceptualization process.  
 The second item on the introduction, “Some Principles of Hylomorphic 
Explanation” continues on the same line described before. There, the author explains 
what hylomorphism is and under which specific account or conception hylomorphism 
must be understood and applied in the De Anima, which concepts are involved in this 
philosophical apparatus, how the Aristotelian four-causal explanatory framework 
plays a role in this context, and how all these elements are articulated within the 
psychological project. The presentation of this theoretical framework leads to the third 
part, where the issue of “Soul and Body” is taken up. The application of the 
hylomorphic apparatus to the issue of the relationship of body and soul is, probably, 
one of the features that make the Aristotelian De Anima so famous. Nevertheless, it 
entails also a certain number of important difficulties where our understanding of the 
hylomorphist account is challenged by the consequences to which it gives rise in the 
psychological framework. The author offers a very interesting introduction to them, 
providing an account of the philosophical issues involved, some important positions 
on the discussion and several sketches (some more developed than others) of his own 
interpretation. 
 The last subject treated in the introduction is that of the “Faculties of the 
Soul”. This, which is one of the most important doctrinal aspects of the De Anima is 
treated with some detail, providing an exposition of the main faculties (he does not 
focus on locomotion or imagination there, though), making a short but precise 
explanation of the Aristotelian account, and of the philosophical richness of the 
subject.     
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Translation and Source 
 
The translation is, of course, one of the two main features of the volume (the 
other one is the commentary). As I said before, the mere fact of providing a 
translation of the full book is already a sign of improvement in relation to the former 
version of the Clarendon Aristotle Series’ De Anima. A note on the text preludes the 
translation. Shields says there that he did his translation based on Ross 1961 edition, 
but he points out that a lot of “careful consideration” should be taken in dealing with 
this edition. The reasons for that advice include Ross’ own philological and disputable 
choices, but also the fact that, in Shields words, “we do have a text based upon a 
much broader range of manuscripts that Ross or any other textual critic before him 
had consulted”: Siwek’s 1965 Tractatus De Anima (p. xlv). Although Shields 
expresses warm approval of Siwek’s edition, complaining about its very poor 
circulation, and saying that is better documented than Ross’, he does not employ it as 
his main text. Rather, he points out that he is not following Ross in “some fifty-five 
passages, and in dozens more” he has important reservations.  
 In total, Shields translation contains sixty-seven passages where he adopts a 
different reading in the Greek text: some notes are on Ross’ edition of the Greek text; 
some others are indications that a conjecture of an interpreter is being adopted; a few 
more are about some modifications in the order of the text and transpositions of lines 
accepted for this version. What is striking about this is that, at least, twenty-four of 
these readings differing from Ross’ are present in another more recent edition, that of 
Jannone (1966), which takes into account more manuscripts than Ross does; mainly, it 
should be noticed that manuscript Ha, which is very important to Jannone’s edition, 
supports some of Shield’s readings.  
Given the particularities of the text chosen as the basis for the translation, it is 
strange that Shields did not use a more recent or more complete edition. We can 
imagine that he does so because Ross’ edition is more known or circulated than the 
others. Nevertheless, if there is better material available, maybe a translator would be 
better served to use it, rather than in correcting another version.  
 Even if the translation follows the original Greel text very closely and tries to 
be very precise in the choice and systematical use of a single translation of a given 
term (mostly, of technical terms), it does not always do so, which is an important 
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strength. This translation shows the fact that languages are, by nature, polysemic, and 
that a philosopher is not far away from being a native user of his own language. This 
is clearly noticed in Shields’ flexibility to translate, i.e. a word like ‘λόγος’ according 
to the context (see, for example, the commentary on page 99, 176 and the glossary 
entry on page 381), or in the presentation he made of the difficulties that faces a 
unique translation of ‘νοῦς’ (p. 294). This is why it should be remarked that in this 
case the principle of lexical accuracy does not lead to immobility or to obscurity.  
 
Commentary 
 
The second important feature of this work is the commentary, which is a very 
illuminating piece of hermeneutical effort on the treatise. One thing should be 
remembered: this commentary does not contain philological or textual criticism (it 
contains very few mentions of that kind of issues).  
That the commentary’s aim is not philological does not mean that it does not 
follow the progression of the text. As a matter of fact, it does, even if it is not a line-
by-line commentary, and it puts very little stress on the Greek. The commentary is 
organized according to the order of the three books and its chapters respectively, but 
instead of focusing on lines or sentences it targets argumentative blocks. Thus, we 
find for each chapter an introduction, were Shields explains the content of the whole 
chapter, and then we are provided with some “subchapters”, each named according to 
the main topic they deal with: the subject, or a methodological feature (description of 
a phenomenon, formulation of problems, objections to some theory). This is very 
useful since it helps to follow the interpretive proposal Shileds offers, on the grounds 
of an understanding of the organization and structure of the Aristotelian treatise and 
investigative procedure; it is also very uselful, since it frames the explanation on 
specific problems and, because of this, the philosophical points that the author 
provides to us for the discussion are clear. 
I will present some important points that I think deserve to be taken into 
account, either for the way Shields interprets (or also because of some silences), or for 
his exegetical strategy, or for the connection with the translation.   
 
1. Book I. 
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Aside from the fact that this volume is equipped with the translation of the 
first book, it also provides a commentary, which focuses on the passage where it finds 
the Aristotelian methodological statements and the definitional background of the 
present inquiry.  
In the very first chapter of Book I, Aristotle offers methodological 
considerations regarding the inquiry he is about to start. Those methodological claims 
are formulated as aporiai that, in one way or another, give structure to the 
investigation. One of the puzzles presented has to do with the possibility of employing 
the properties of a given substance to acquire the knowledge of what this thing is. In 
that context, Aristotle says: 
This is a case wher[a] For when we can render an account of all or most of the properties 
according to imagination (κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν), we will also then be able to speak best about 
the substance (DA 402b22-25). 
Here, I think, we are entitled to call into question the translation of 
‘φαντασία’. It is clear to me that the translation of the term in this passage is in 
absolute consonance with the lexical choice in all the other occurrences of the term in 
the treatise. However, I am not convinced that keeping uniformity in this case helps us 
understand what Aristotle meant, for it is not clear what we should understand by a 
process of “rendering an account of something according to imagination” in a 
discussion about definition. All the translators of the De Anima in English (but also in 
other languages) that I know of, in this very case use a different meaning for the word 
‘φαντασία’: for example, in English we have “attributes as they appear to us” 
(Hamlyn 1993 p. 3); or “attributes as they are presented to us” (Hicks 1907 p. 7).†  
Now, one might think that the definition of imagination given in Book III, 3 
could be adequate to the context of this passage: “For then imagining will be 
believing, non-co-incidentally, the very thing one perceives” (DA 428b1). Yet Shields 
is not that generous in this case: he does not explain how we must understand the 
faculty in this passage, or why we should. In the commentary to the passage we find a 
very interesting discussion of the plausibility of the procedure described by Aristotle, 
given that the properties of a thing are necessarily linked with that thing’s essence, but 
he never mentions the expression ‘κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν’, nor does he explain why we 
                                                     
† On why Aristotle here cannot be making reference to the faculty, see Hicks (1907 p. 192) 
and Boeri (2010 p. 6) 
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should think that here we’re invited to a definitional procedure stressing the 
imaginative capacity.  
Nevertheless, I do call attention to this fact because it does not seem that 
Shields absolutely rejects the fact that ‘φαντασία’ can mean something different than 
just “imagination” (which, as I said, may obey just to a need of lexical consistency). 
The proof for me is in Shields own commentary when he refers to ‘φαντασία’ using 
the word “appearance” (p. 96, 275 and 366) and he just gives one reason: “in English, 
‘appearance’ is not normally associated with a mental faculty, while ‘imagination’ is 
regularly associated with too narrow a faculty”. He says, though, that he prefers to use 
‘imagination’ given its philosophical pedigree. However, it seems to me that in the 
very first occurrence the translation of ‘κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν’ as ‘according to 
imagination’ does not capture completely the fact that giving an account of the 
properties that we grasp by the senses when we perceive something can also help in 
the definitional process. (It should be taken in account that this is, pretty much, what 
the predecessors seem to have done and the reason why their views are worth 
considering.) At least, this difference is not that evident, and could be easily solved 
with an explanation in the commentary. 
It should be remarked that the treatment the author gives to the doxographical 
section is serious and lengthy. The customary way of dealing with this kind of 
collection of opinions is to focus on the person Aristotle is presenting and to give 
some historical-erudite note on that character. Shields does not engage in that 
procedure; rather, he tries to explain the very function of these opinions in the context 
of the De Anima, except maybe in the case of the “kinetists catalogue” of the end of 
chapter two. In this case, we are provided with a description of the theory as presented 
by Aristotle, but he says very little about the role that this theory plays in the whole 
project of the first Book. Yet, the effort of dealing with Book I is reinforced with 
some remarks about the reconstruction process that Aristotle is performing on his 
predecessors’ opinions. There is no reference, though, a reference to the 
reconstruction of these arguments by Harold Cherniss (1935 p. 289)‡, or at least a 
discussion of the interpretation which seem to continue to be the dominant 
interpretation of how Aristotle deals with his predecessors.  
                                                     
‡ I will provide some bibliography that I think crucial for the subject of the De Anima, which 
is, however, missing in the bibliography in Shields’ volume. 
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Despite his improvements and efforts, Shields seems to be on the same page of 
the tradition, namely, to interpret these dialectical reviews just as états de l’art, or a 
way, on Aristotle’s part, of showing his intellectual supremacy. We never get an 
explanation of how the dialectical review is articulated with the methodological 
claims of Aristotle, if it is the case, or how it is not the case. This topic, namely, the 
articulation between doxography and the program of the treatises has been the focus 
of attention of several scholars interested in the Aristotelian doxography, among who 
we can find, specifically talking about the first Book of the De Anima, Charlotte Witt 
(1992 170) and Hans Baltussen (2000 46). There are also different interpretations of 
the scope of this Book I, as the one proposed by Cherniss, but also the ones by Witt 
(1992) and Menn (2002), which may be considered on the debate, for they try to 
explain how this dialectical procedure is crucial for Aristotle’s later interests in the 
treatise. 
 
2. Book II 
 
The commentary on this book has a remarkable particularity: dealing with an 
account, which focuses mainly on perception, Aristotle shows in most of the chapters 
a “primarily physiological” orientation (p. 240). Because of that, it may seem that 
most of the commentary is concentrated on the first chapters, and the last ones are 
treated less. However, the commentary proposed by Shields shows even in those 
physiological passages some important elements of Aristotelian coinage. 
 The commentary on the first five chapters targets some important definitional 
issues that have become classic within specialized criticism. One of them is the 
distinctions between two meanings of the word ‘ἐντελέχεια’, and the way in which 
those meanings must be applied to the understanding of the famous statement that the 
soul is “the first actuality of a natural body which has life in potentiality” (cf. DA 
412b5).  
Nevertheless, there is a matter related to translation, which can have an 
incidence on the potential grasping of Aristotelian subtle nuances, namely, the 
English choice for ‘ἐντελέχεια’ and ‘ἐνέργεια’, since both terms are rendered as 
“actuality” in Shield’s translation. I am completely aware that the distinction and 
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relation between both terms is a very disputed issue§. Shields never entertain the 
subject in his commentary; he does, though, in the glossary in the entry “Actuality, 
Activity” (p. 382). There he provides a brief summary of how both terms “differ 
slightly in meaning”, but he does not actually give an argument to avoid a 
differentiation in translation. Nevertheless, I really think that rendering both terms in 
the same way may be a source of confusion.  
On the one hand, it is true that those terms can be treated, sometimes, as 
almost synonymous, and this could be the case in several passages of the De Anima. 
But, on the other hand, it cannot be proven beyond any doubt that this synonymy is a 
rule in all the occurrences of those terms in the treatise (not to talk about the whole 
corpus). This situation is particularly remarkable in Book II, chapter 5, where the 
hylomorphic apparatus is applied for the analysis of perception.  
The second book opens with the correlation between the pair of opposites 
matter-form and potentiality-actuality: 
[a] Matter is potentiality, while form is actuality (ἐντελέχεια); and actuality**  (τοῦτο) is 
spoken of in two ways, first as knowledge, and second as contemplating is (DA 412a9-11).  
As can be noticed, the correlation between both pairs of opposites is 
established without much difficulty. Nevertheless, the last term in this equation, 
actuality, entails a distinction, which is better elaborated few lines before:  
[b] Actuality (αὕτη) is spoken of in two ways, first as knowledge is, and second as 
contemplating is. Evidently, then, the soul is actuality as knowledge is. For both sleeping and 
waking depend upon the soul’s being present; and as waking is analogous to contemplating, 
sleeping is analogous to having knowledge without exercising it (τῷ ἔχειν καὶ μὴ ἐνεργεῖν). 
And in the same individual knowledge is prior in generation. Hence, the soul is the first 
actuality (ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη) of a natural body which has life in potentiality (DA 412a22-
28).  
As is clear, in this passage, very early in Book 2 we get, besides the term 
ἐντελέχεια, the very first occurrence of the idea expressed with the other term in 
                                                     
§ The ambiguity is, in fact, the matter of discussion among critics (Bonitz 1955 253; Menn 
1994 75). There are also scholars who said that it should be given a special attention to every 
occurrence to those terms without generalizations, because it may be a synonymy, it may be 
not (Blair 1993 96). 
** I underlined the words that are interpreted or supplied in these passages by Shields in his 
translation. 
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dispute, ἐνέργεια††. It is also, at least so far as I noticed, the only case in the whole 
book where both terms are not rendered by the same word, “actuality”. This oddity for 
me is an indication that the terms are more than slightly different in meaning in the De 
Anima for Shields himself, and that this distinction has to do with the fact that 
ἐντελέχεια is said in two ways (I think that the explanation of Shield’s in the glossary 
may go in the same direction; see also note 6 below). As I understand the argument, 
there are two senses of ‘ἐντελέχεια’: (i) a sense in which it is active permanently, a 
perfect act, as someone who is “already contemplating, who is in actuality and strictly 
knowing this A” (DA 417a29; p. 33), and a sense (ii) in which some capacity is in 
potency (a human being knows by being in the class of knowers), or when such a 
capacity already acquired may come to be in activity (a human knows when they have 
a given kind of knowledge, even if they are not executing a task involving that 
knowledge). When we speak of the soul, not in a qualified way, we refer to the second 
sense, in which we say that soul is present in living things as long as they are living, 
no matter the psychic functions they are, or are not, currently experiencing‡‡. 
However, there is another distinction between these two terms, namely 
ἐντελέχεια can be taken as ranging over all functions of the soul, whereas ἐνέργεια 
denotes a specific function of the soul, like seeing or hearing. According to this 
second contrast, the soul is an ‘ἐντελέχεια’ in a qualified sense as an ἐνέργεια, for it 
appeals to a particular function that is not always operative, so that ἐντελέχεια will be 
a term with a more broad use, and ἐνέργεια should be reserved when denoting the 
execution of a certain activity. As Shields seems to accept this second way of 
contrasting ἐντελέχεια and ἐνέργεια (in the way he understands the two senses of 
ἐντελέχεια), he should have taken more care in translating both terms differently, so 
                                                     
†† In this case, though, we do not have a noun, but an infinitive. Nevertheless, infinitives work 
also as substantives, and they can also construct prepositional syntagms with adverbial value, 
like in this case. So, this may be counted as an occurrence of the idea I am seeking for. The 
other thing to bear in mind is that both the substantive and the verb are neologism of 
Aristotle’s own coinage (Menn 1994 75), so their semantic and functional frames obey to a 
specific technical employment. 
‡‡ I think that this point is very well explained by Shields: “Minimally, of course, it must be 
allowed that necessarily if x has a soul, then x is alive. It does not follow immediately, 
however, that if x is alive at time t that at t x is currently actually (= second actuality) 
engaging in some one of life’s characteristic functions, i.e. digesting, or reproducing, or 
perceiving or knowing (cf. 412a14-15, 415b28). To insist that whatever is actually ensouled is 
actually (= second actuality) living, is simply to insist without argument that the distinction 
introduced here collapses or is otherwise incoherent. Aristotle is not constrained to accept 
either of these conclusions” (p. 171). 
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as to allow the reader to make up his mind about the significance of the distinction, or 
its irrelevance.  
 The concentration of occurrences of the term ‘ἐνέργεια’ and ‘ἐντελέχεια’ in 
book 2 is to be met in chapter 5. This chapter is crucial to understand if there is, or if 
there is not, a difference. But given that fact, the translation fails to show that this 
distinction is marked with a careful placing of both terms. Consider the following 
text: 
[c] One must also draw a distinction concerning potentiality and actuality (ἐντελεχείας). For 
we have just now been speaking of them without qualification. In the first case, something is 
a knower in the way in which we might say that a human knows because humans belong to 
the class of knowers and to those things which have knowledge; but in the second case, we 
say directly that the one who has grammatical knowledge knows. These are not in the same 
way potential knowers; instead, the first one because his genus and matter are of a certain 
sort, and the other because he has the potential to contemplate whensoever he wishes, so long 
as nothing external hinders him. Yet another sort of knower is the one already contemplating, 
who is in actuality (ἐντελεχείᾳ) and strictly knowing this A. In the first two cases, then, those 
knowing in potentiality come to be knowers in actuality (ἐνεργείᾳ), but the first one by being 
altered through learning, with frequent changes from a contrary state; and the other, from 
having arithmetical or grammatical knowledge and not actualizing it (μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δέ) to 
actualizing (εἰς τὸ ἐνεργεῖν) in another way (DA 417a21-b2). 
This passage seems to provide a good piece of evidence in favour of a 
distinction between both terms. Aristotle is providing three cases where just one, the 
third one, is properly speaking an ἐντελέχεια, or as some may say a “full reality”§§; 
the first two are cases of coming to be in act from potentiality (and potentiality is also 
twofold)***. The fact that potency has two meanings, but not two words, for some 
might be an argument for erasing the distinction between ‘ἐντελέχεια’ and ‘ἐνέργεια’. 
                                                     
§§  I am recovering the sense provided by the LSJ in the numeral II under the entry of 
‘ἐνέργεια’ (1996 p. 564). 
*** I totally suscribe Menn’s interpretation: “Aristotle says that the soul, since it is said like 
ἐπιστήμη and not like θεωρεῖν, is ‘ ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη of a natural body potentially having 
life’ (412a27-28), but this does not mean that there is such a thing as a δευτέρα ἐντελέχεια. 
What Aristotle says (after saying that the soul is ‘an ἐντελέχεια of such a body [412a21-22]) 
is that ‘this is said in two ways, one as ἐπιστήμη, the other as θεωρεῖν’ (412a22, repeating 
412a10-11); he says further on that the act of seeing (ὅρασις) is ἐντελέχεια in one way, and 
the power of sight (ὄψις) is ἐντελέχεια in another (412b27-413a1). This means not that there 
are two kinds of ἐντελέχεια, but that any given ἐντελέχεια (such as seeing or living) can be 
predicated in two ways, through ἔχειν and through ἐνεργεῖν, and therefore that identifying the 
soul with the ἐντελέχεια of living is ambiguous between saying that the soul is present 
whenever something is is living in the weak sense, or only when it is living in the strong 
sense. Ἐντελέχεια by itself indicates the weaker sense of living; it is the ἐνέργεια of the 
ἐντελέχεια that indicates the stronger sense” (1994 105). 
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But maybe this very fact is an argument for proceeding in the exact opposite way†††. 
Some may say that ‘δύναμις’ is an equivocal term, for just the same reason, and that 
the distinction between ‘ἐντελέχεια’ and ‘ἐνέργεια’ must be stressed. It is possible that 
‘ἐντελέχεια’ denotes the possession of soul, with all that it implies, and ‘ἐνέργεια’ 
marks only the activity or execution of the potencies of the soul.  
 There is also another front in the debate. There are some scholars who doubt 
the utility or necessity of ‘ἐντελέχεια’ if ‘ἐνέργεια’ was already available. This may 
be a key question to make: why if they are synonymous, or “differ slightly in 
meaning”, so slightly not to make any differentiation between them in a translation, 
did Aristotle need another term?‡‡‡ Some scholars stress the fact that the reason may 
be the need of a metaphysical term avoiding “the connotation of κίνησις inherent in 
ἐνέργεια” (Graham 1989 80). This is a hypothesis that, if not accepted at the light of 
the De Anima’s evidence, at least deserves to be discussed. 
Of course, this is not the place to provide a defense of a particular reading of 
Aristotle’s theory of act and potency, or anything similar. Nevertheless, I think we are 
not faced with a random usage of the terms, as one may expect if they were 
synonymous or, at least, if they were not marking some difference§§§. I think that 
those passages, among others, show that a distinction in the translation of the terms 
could, at least, prevent a Greekless reader of failing to notice this fact, which is an 
important topic in Aristotelian studies****. And I think that Shields himself points on 
that distinction sometimes, which is enough reason to maintain the distinction of both 
terms in the translation. 
 
                                                     
†††  For example, the account that the first actuality corresponds to the first potency and, 
likewise, the second actuality corresponds to the second potency. This is what Menn calls the 
‘standard picture’ for integrating the power-activity distinction with the potentiality-actuality 
distinction (1994 88). 
‡‡‡  “Considering that ἐντελέχεια (with its rather awkward dative form ἐντελεχείᾳ as a 
substitute for an adjective or an adverb) appears in his writings only 138 times, it seems odd 
that he would have felt the need for a new word which was indistinguishable in meaning from 
words he used more tan twice as often” (Blair 1993 93). 
§§§ Polansky noticed something similar: “Nevertheless, examination of all the appearances in 
this treatise discloses that he limits himself to entelecheia here in the definition of soul, while 
he tends to use energeia to speak of the operation and condition of the faculties of soul and 
their objects” (2007 150). 
**** Besides Menn (1994), the debate can be reconstructed also with the aid of Graham (1989 
75). 
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3. Book III 
 
The commentary on Book three is the most interesting and elaborated. I am of 
this opinion because: (i) the explanations on the text are very detailed; (ii) we can find 
a good presentation on the debate that the text has inspired and a contrast between 
different positions, most of them in English language (which contrast with the discrete 
presence of the discussion with other scholars in the commentaries of the previous 
books); and (iii) the advantages and consequences of those positions are presented. I 
will discuss two passages: one, where this spirit is not that present; the other one, 
where it is crystal clear. 
Chapter 1 contains a famous line that has been the source of certain 
astonishment among Aristotelian scholars. The subject is the perception of the 
common objects of perception which, among others things, are not exclusive objects 
of any of the five senses. They are not, though, perceived co-incidentally, as an 
exclusive object of taste (sweetness) is perceived by sight. Nevertheless, there is a 
passage of this chapter, which opens and closes in what we might call a contradictory 
way: 
[a] Moreover, there cannot be some special sensory organ for the common objects, which we 
perceive co-incidentally by each sense (ὧν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανόμεθα κατὰ 
συμβεβηκός)†††† –for example, motion, rest, shape, magnitude, number, and unity. For all of 
these we perceive by motion: for example, we perceive magnitude by motion (and 
consequently, shape, since shape is a sort of magnitude); something at rest in virtue of its not 
being moved; number in virtue of the lack of continuity as well as by the peculiar objects of 
perception (since each sense perceives one thing). Consequently, it is clear that there cannot 
be any special sense for these, for instance, for motion. For in this way things will be just as 
they are now when we perceive the sweet by sight: this occurs because we as a matter of fact 
have a perception of them both, by which we come to know them at the same time when they 
occur together. Otherwise, we would never perceive such things other that co-incidentally. 
For example, we perceive the son of Cleon not because he is the son of Cleon, but because he 
is a white thing, and it is co-incidental to this white thing to be the son of Cleon. We have 
common perception of the common objects, however, and a not co-incidental one (τῶν δὲ 
κοινῶν ἤδη ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν κοινήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός). Thus these are not exclusive 
objects; otherwise, we would not perceive them in any way other than in the way just 
mentioned that we see the son of Cleon. (DA 425a14-30) 
The difficulty, as can be seen, has lead Torstrik to intervene the first sentence 
in order to include a negation before the prepositional syntagm, as it is in below in the 
same passage. This emendation, however, has not been followed by the most part of 
                                                     
†††† In this passage I underlined the clauses involved mainly in the debate. 
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the interpreters in the text, although they have followed it somehow in spirit. So, the 
way they choose to overcome this difficulty without intervening the passage has been 
much discussed in the philosophical debate.  
However Shields here seems to avoid the problem. In his commentary to the 
passage he recognizes the problem, and admits that the emendation “though 
understandable, is unnecessary”, but he just says that it should be understood 
somehow as an endoxon Aristotle does not accept. In Shields’ view, he is 
“entertaining a counterfactual hypothesis whose dominant contention he does not 
himself accept” (p. 261). It does not seem, because of the progression of the 
discussion in the passage, that it is the case. At least, we don’t advice dialectical 
marks or a refutational context. So, it seems that Shields’ hypothesis is neither, prima 
facie, convincing, neither enough explained. This line has produced several 
interpretive possibilities, however. Surprisingly, in this case we do not find the 
discussion of a single one of them.   
Shields’ procedure in the second case is more interesting. Although it is a very 
brief, chapter five has been the origin of a large discussion. The introduction to the 
commentary makes explicit why it is that this chapter is so controversial. Shields 
describes it in the most clear way: “Aristotle now distinguishes an active from a 
passive reason […] All of this raises the prospect that despite his plain denial that the 
whole soul is separable in De Anima II 1, reason, taken by itself, may yet be 
separable” (p. 312). Immediately after describing the problem, he presents the two 
main hermeneutical strategies that commentators have been following since 
Themistius’ times: on the one hand, there is the “divine interpretation” (elsewhere 
also known as externalist), which argues that Aristotle is not dealing with the human 
faculty, but with a divine non-human reason; on the other hand, the “human 
interpretation” (or internalist) pleads for avoiding the multiplication of entities, and 
engages in interpreting the dichotomy active-passive reason at the light of other 
dichotomies present in Aristotle’s own tool box: act-potency or perception-intelection, 
and so forth.  
Shields carefully disposes both lines of interpretation, one in front of the other, 
applied to every argumentative step on the chapter. This is noteworthy, since both of 
the positions count with prominent counselors (it is strange, though, that Caston is 
counted as a militant of both armies). In this arrangement, the author is very neat in 
not showing a decided compromise with any of the interpretations; he rather presents 
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them as equivalent, and convincingly. The outcome of this attitude is that he is able to 
show the huge complexity of the debate, acting more as a provider of tools for the 
reader, rather than pontificating. Nevertheless, it seems that he is more akin with the 
“human interpretation”, when he denounces that a possibly undesirable result of this 
hermeneutical strategy could be “to foist upon Aristotle a Platonic, or still more 
anachronistically, a Christian conception of human immortality. Such an approach is, 
inter alia, out of keeping with the pervasively naturalistic and biological tenor of the 
De Anima, which treats human beings as natural, ration, corporeal beings” (p. 315).  
Nevertheless, the absence of a decision leaves us without understanding how 
this chapter fits into Shields’ whole interpretation of the De Anima. This may mean 
that the text continues to be obscure to the author, or because the reading on this 
chapter does not affect his reading of the treatise in its totality.  
 
Bibliography 
 
I completely agree with Shields: the task of providing an exhaustive bibliography 
for the De Anima is a very difficult mission because of its vastness. In general what is 
provided to us, mainly in English, is a very good amount of literature, and certainly 
the most reputed and useful possible. There are very few omissions that I want to 
point out:  
The text “Shields (2011)” that we found quoted in the commentary (p. 89, 181) is 
not listed in the bibliography.  
We do not find the classic work by Harold Cherniss (1935), or some important 
discussions on the doxographical procedure of book one, like that of Witt (1992) and 
Baltussen (2000). The discussion on the definitional procedure of book II also could 
well received more attention. The discussion on the ‘ἐντελέχεια’ and its relation to the 
concept of  ‘ἐνέργεια’ is, except for the texts by Kosman, completely left aside. 
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